It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in society better protects property from expropriation. We use a model of multilateral bargaining to demonstrate that this intuition may be ‡awed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property protection. One is formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution that is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where players without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal veto power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their in ‡uence to prevent redistributions. In a stable allocation, the society exhibits a "class"structure with class members having equal wealth and strategically protecting each other from redistribution.
Introduction
Economists have long viewed protection of property rights as a cornerstone of e¢ ciency and economic development (e.g., Coase, 1937 , Alchian, 1965 , Hart and Moore, 1990 ). Yet, from a political economy perspective, property rights should be understood as equilibrium outcomes rather than exogenous constraints. Legislators or, more generally, any political actors cannot commit to entitlements, prerogatives, and rights. Whether property rights are e¤ectively protected depends on the political economy of the respective society and its institutions. The idea that granting veto power to di¤erent actors in the society enhances protection dates back at least to the Roman republic (Polybius [2010] , Machiavelli 1515 Machiavelli [1984 ) and, in modern times, to Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws (1748 Laws ( [1989 ) and the Federalist papers, the intellectual foundation of the United States Constitution. In essay No. 51, James Madison argued for the need to contrive the government "as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." Riker (1987) concurs: "For those who believe, with Madison, that freedom depends on countering ambition with ambition, this constancy of federal con ‡ict is a fundamental protection of freedom."
In modern political economy, an increased number of veto players has been associated with bene…cial consequences. North and Weingast (1989) argued that the British parliament, empowered at the expense of the crown by the Glorious Revolution in 1688, provided "the credible commitment by the government to honour its …nancial agreement [that] was part of a larger commitment to secure private rights". Root (1989) demonstrated that this allowed British monarchs to have lower borrowing costs compared to the French kings. In Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997, 2000) , separation of taxing and spending decisions within budgetary decision-makings improves the accountability of elected o¢ cials and limits rent-seeking by politicians.
We study political mechanisms that ensure protection against expropriation by a majority. In practice, institutions come in di¤erent forms such as the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, multi-cameralism, federalism, supermajority requirements and other constitutional arrangements that e¤ectively provide some players with veto power. One of the …rst examples was described by Plutarch [2010] : the Spartan Gerousia, the Council of Elders could veto motions passed by the Apella, the citizens'assembly. In other polities, it might be just individuals with guns who have e¤ective veto power. Essentially, all these institutions allow individuals or collective actors to block any redistribution without their consent. If we interpret property rights as institutions that allow holders to prevent reallocations without their consent, then we can formally investigate the e¤ect of veto power on the allocation of property.
In addition to property rights, formalized in constitutions or codes of law, i.e., game forms in a theoretical model, property rights might be protected as equilibrium outcomes of interaction of strategic economic agents. The property rights of an individual may be respected not because he is powerful enough to protect them on his own, i.e., has veto power, but because others …nd it in their respective interest to protect his rights. Speci…cally, members of a coalition, formed in equilibrium, have an incentive to oppose the expropriation of each other because they know that once a member of the group is expropriated, others will be expropriated as well. As a result, the current allocation of assets might be secure even in the absence of explicit veto power.
If property rights may emerge from strategic behavior of rational economic agents, such rights are necessarily dynamic in nature. A status quo allocation of assets stays in place for the next period, unless it is changed by the political decision mechanism in which case the newly chosen allocation becomes the status quo for the next period. This makes models of legislative bargaining with the endogenous status-quo (following Baron, 1996 , and Kalandrakis, 2004 , 2007 ) the natural foundation for studying political economy of redistribution and protection of property from expropriation. 1
In our model, agents, some of which have veto power, decide on allocation of a …nite number of units. If the (super)majority decides on redistribution, the new allocation becomes the status-quo for the next period. We start by showing that non-veto players build coalitions to protect each other against redistribution. Diermeier and Fong (2011) demonstrated that with a sole agendasetter, two other players could form a coalition to protect each other from expropriation by the agenda-setter. However, this feature is much more general: our Propositions 1-3 show that such coalitions form in a general multilateral setting with any number of veto players. The size of a protective coalition is a function of the supermajority requirement and the number of veto players.
Example 1 demonstrates that with …ve players, one of which has veto power, three non-veto players with equal wealth form a coalition to protect each other.
Example 1 Consider …ve players who decide how to split 10 indivisible units of wealth, with the status quo being (1; 2; 3; 4; 0). Player #5 is the sole veto player and proposer, any reallocation requires a majority of votes, and we assume that when players are indi¤erent, they support the proposer. In a standard legislative bargaining model, the game ends when a proposal is accepted.
Then, player #5 would simply build a coalition to expropriate two players, say #3 and #4; and capture the surplus resulting in (1; 2; 0; 0; 7). However, this logic does not hold in a dynamic model where the agreed upon allocation can be redistributed in the subsequent periods. That is, with the new status quo (1; 2; 0; 0; 7); player #5 would propose to expropriate players #1 and #2 by moving to (0; 0; 0; 0; 10), which is accepted in equilibrium. Anticipating this, players #1 and #2 should not agree to the …rst expropriation, thus becoming the e¤ective guarantors of property rights of players #3 and #4. Starting with (1; 2; 3; 4; 0), the ultimate equilibrium allocation might be either (3; 3; 3; 0; 1) or (2; 2; 2; 0; 4) or (2; 2; 0; 2; 4); in either case, at least three players will not be worse o¤. In general, an allocation is stable if and only if there is a group of three non-veto players of equal wealth, and the remaining non-veto player has an allocation of zero.
The fact that all non-veto players who are not expropriated in Example 1 have the same wealth in the ultimate stable allocation is not accidental. With a single proposer, we cannot isolate the impact of veto power from the impact of agenda-setting power; non-veto players have no chance to be agenda-setters, and their action space is very limited. With multiple veto players and multiple agenda-setters without veto power, we demonstrate that the endogenous veto groups have a certain "class structure": in a stable allocation, most of the non-veto players are subdivided into groups of equal size, within each of which individual players have the same amount of wealth, whereas the rest of the society is fully expropriated. While we make speci…c assumptions to single out equilibria to focus on, the "class structure" is robust (see Section 5 for the discussion).
Example 2 Consider the economy as in Example 1, yet 4 votes, rather than 3, are required to change the status quo. Now, if the initial status quo is (1; 2; 3; 4; 0); which is unstable, the ultimate stable allocation will be (1; 3; 3; 1; 2), i.e. two endogenous veto groups will be formed (players #1 and #4 form one, and #2 and #3 form the other). In general, with 5 players, 1 veto player and 4 votes required to change the status quo, all stable sets are of the following form, up to permutations: (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ; x 5 ) with x 1 = x 2 and x 3 = x 4 . This is the simplest example of a society exhibiting a nontrivial class structure.
The number and size of these endogenous classes vary as a function of the number of veto players and the supermajority requirements. Perhaps paradoxically, adding additional exogenous protection (e.g., by increasing the number of veto players) may lead to the break-down of an equilibrium with stable property rights, as the newly empowered player (the one that was granted or has acquired veto power) now no longer has an incentive to protect the others. Thus, by adding additional hurdles to expropriation in the form of veto players or super-majority requirements (see Example 4 below), the protection of property rights may in fact be eroded. In other words, players' property may be well-protected in the absence of formal constraints, while strengthening formal constraints may result in expropriation. Our next example demonstrates this e¤ect more formally.
Example 3 As in Example 1, there are 5 players and 3 votes are required to make a change, but now there are two veto players instead of one, #4 and #5. Allocations (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ; x 5 ), in which at least one of players #1; #2; #3 has zero wealth and at least one has a positive amount, are unstable as the two veto players will obtain the vote of one player an allocation of zero and redistribute the assets of the remaining two players. One can prove that an allocation is stable if and only if x 1 = x 2 = x 3 (up to a permutation). This means that if we start with (3; 3; 3; 0; 1) ; which was stable with one veto player, making player #1 an additional veto player will destroy stability. As a result, the society will move either to an allocation in which all 10 units are split between the two veto players, or to some allocation where the non-veto players form an endogenous veto group that protects its members from further expropriation, e.g., (4; 1; 1; 1; 3), in which #2-4 form such group.
We see here an interesting phenomenon. The naive intuition would suggest that giving one extra player (player #1 in this example) veto power would make it more di¢ cult for player #5 to expropriate the rest of the group. However, the introduction of a new veto player breaks the stable coalition of non-veto players, and makes #5 more powerful. Before the change, non-veto players sustained an equal allocation, precisely because they were more vulnerable individually. With only one veto player and an equal allocation for players #1, #2, and #3, the three non-veto players form an endogenous veto group, which blocks any transition that hurts the group as a whole (or even one of them). An additional veto player makes expropriation more, not less, likely. Note that both the amount of wealth being redistributed and the number of players a¤ected by expropriation are signi…cant. The number of players who stand to lose is two, close to a half of the total number of players, and at least 4 units, close to a half of the total wealth is redistributed through voting. In Proposition 4, we show that the class structure, which is a function of the number of veto players and the supermajority requirement, determines a limit to the amount of wealth redistributed after an exogenous shock to one player's wealth.
In addition to granting veto rights, changes to the decision-making rule (e.g., the degree of supermajority) can also have a profound, yet somewhat unexpected e¤ect on protection of property.
Higher supermajority rules are usually considered safeguards that make expropriation more di¢ cult, as one would need to build a larger coalition. The next example shows that this intuition is ‡awed as well: in a dynamic environment, increasing the supermajority requirements may trigger additional redistribution.
Example 4 As above, there are 5 players that make redistributive decisions by majority, and one of which (#5) has veto power. Allocation (3; 3; 3; 0; 1) is stable. Now, instead of a change in the number of veto players, consider a change in the supermajority requirements. If a new rule requires 4 votes, rather than 3, the status quo allocation becomes unstable. Instead, a transition to one of the allocations that become stable, (3; 3; 0; 0; 4) or (4; 4; 0; 0; 2), will be supported by coalition of four players out of …ve. (The veto-player, #5; bene…ts from the move, #4 is indi¤erent as he gets 0 in both allocations, and #1-2 will support this move as they realize that with the new supermajority requirement they form a group which is su¢ cient to protect its members against any expropriation.) Thus, an increase in supermajority may result in expropriation and redistribution.
As Example 4 demonstrates, raising the supermajority requirement does not necessarily strengthen property rights as some players are expropriated as a result. Proposition 6 establishes that this phenomenon, as well as the one discussed in Example 3, is generic: adding a veto player or raising the supermajority requirement almost always leads to a wave of redistribution. To obtain the comparative statics results described in Examples 3 and 4 (Propositions 5 and 6), we use a general characterization of politically stable allocations in a multilateral-negotiations settings (Proposition 3). These results contrast with the existing consensus in the literature, summarized by Tsebelis (2002) : "As the number of veto players of a political system increase, policy stability increases".
Redistribution through over-taxation (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000) or an outright expropriation (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) has been the focus of political economy studies since at least Machiavelli (1515) [1984] and Hobbes (1651) [1991] . A large number of works explored the relationship between a strong executive and his multiple subjects (e.g., Greif, 2006, powerful executive exploited the existing cleavages for personal gain. In addition to the multilateral bargaining literature, policy evolution with endogenous quo is studied, among others, in Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) , Hassler, Storesletten, Mora, and Zilibotti (2003) , Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2009) , Coate (2007, 2008) , and Battaglini and Palfrey (2012) . To this diverse literature, our model adds the emergence of "class politics"; also, we demonstrate that introduction of formal institutions of property rights protection might result, in equilibrium, in less protection than before.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our general model.
In Section 3, we establish the existence of (pure-strategy Markov perfect) equilibrium in a noncooperative game and provide full characterization of stable wealth allocations. Section 4 focuses on the impact of changes in the number of veto players or supermajority requirements. In Section 5, we discuss our modeling assumptions and robustness of our results, while Section 6 concludes. The Online Appendix contains technical proofs and some additional examples and counterexamples.
Setup
Consider a set N of n = jN j political agents who allocate a set of indivisible identical objects between themselves. In the beginning, there are b objects, and the set of feasible allocations is
We use lower index x i to denote the amount player i gets in allocation x 2 A throughout the paper, and we denote the total number of objects in allocation x by kxk = P i2N x i . Time is discrete and indexed by t > 0, and the players have a common discount factor . In each period t, the society inherits x t 1 from the previous period (x 0 is given exogenously) and determines x t through an agenda-setting and voting procedure. A transition from x t 1 to some alternative y 2 A is feasible if kyk x t 1 ; in other words, we allow for the objects to be wasted, but not for the creation of new objects. 2 For a feasible alternative y to defeat the status quo x t 1
and become x t , it needs to gain the support of a su¢ ciently large coalition of agents.
To de…ne which coalitions are powerful enough to redistribute, we use the language of winning coalitions. Let V N be a non-empty set of veto players (denote v = jV j; without loss of generality, let us assume that V corresponds to the last v agents n v + 1; : : : ; n), and let k 2 [v; n] be a positive integer. A coalition X is winning if and only if (a) V X and (b) jXj k. The set of winning coalitions is denoted by W:
In this case, we say that the society is governed by a k-rule with veto players V , meaning that a transition is successful if it is supported by at least k players and no veto player opposes it. We will compare the results for di¤erent k and v. We maintain the assumption that there is at least one veto player-that V is non-empty-throughout the paper; this helps us capture various political institutions such as a supreme court. We do not require that k > n=2, so we allow for minority rules. For example, 1-rule with the set of veto players fig is a dictatorship of player i.
Our goal is to focus on redistribution from politically weak players to politically powerful ones, and especially on the limits to such redistribution. We thus introduce the following assumption to enable veto players to buy the votes of those who would otherwise be indi¤erent. In each period, there is an arbitrarily small budget that the players can distribute in this period; its default size is ", and there is another " for each unit transferred from non-veto players to veto players. Furthermore, to avoid equilibria where non-veto players shu-e the units between themselves, we assume that there is a small transition cost 2 (0; ") that is subtracted from the budget every time there is a transition. 3 A feasible proposal in period t is therefore a pair (y; ) such that y 2 A that satis…es kyk x t 1 and i 2 R n satis…es i 0 for all i 2 N and
. Throughout the paper, we assume 0 < < " < 1 b+1 . (We will show that as "; ! 0, the equilibria converge to some equilibria of the game where " = = 0; thus, focusing on equilibria that may be approximated in this way may be thought of as equilibrium re…nement that rules out uninteresting equilibria, speci…cally the ones that feature cycles. 4 )
The timing of the game below uses the notion of a protocol, which might be any …nite sequence of players (possibly with repetition); for existence results, however, we require it to end with a veto player. 5 We denote the set of protocols by , so
The protocol to be used is realized in the beginning of each period, taken from a distribution D that has full support on (to save on notation, we assume that each veto player is equally likely to be last one, but this assumption does not a¤ect our results). If the players fail to reach an agreement, the status quo prevails in the next period. Thus, in each period t, each agent i gets instantaneous
5. If j < t , where j j denotes the length of protocol ; then the game moves to stage 2 with j increased by 1. Otherwise, the society keeps the status allocation x t = x t 1 , and the game proceeds to the next stage.
6. Each player i receives an instantaneous payo¤ u t i .
The equilibrium concept we use is Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE). In any such equilibrium , the transition mapping = : A ! A, which maps the previous period's allocation and the protocol realization for the current period into the current period's allocation, is well-
de…ned. In what follows, we focus on protocol-free equilibria (protocol-free MPE 7 ), namely, such that (x; ) = (x; 0 ) for all x 2 A and ; 0 2 . We thus abuse notation and write = : A ! A to denote the transition mapping of such equilibria.
Analysis
Our strategy is as follows. We start by proving some basic results about equilibria of the noncooperative game described above. Then, we characterize stable allocations, i.e. allocations with no redistribution, and demonstrate that the stable allocations correspond to equilibria of the noncooperative game. We then proceed to studying comparative statics with respect to the number of veto players, supermajority requirements, and equilibrium paths that follow an exogenous shock to some players'wealth.
Non-cooperative Characterization
Consider a protocol-free MPE , and let = be the transition mapping that is generated by and de…ned in the end of Section 2. (Using transition mappings, rather than individuals'agendasetting and voting strategies, allows us to capture equilibrium paths in terms of allocations and transitions, i.e., in a more concise way). Iterating the mapping gives a sequence of mappings ; 2 ; 3 ; : : : : A ! A, which must converge if is acyclic. (Mapping is acyclic if x 6 = (x) implies x 6 = (x) for any > 1; we will show that every MPE satis…es this property.) Denote this limit by 1 , which is simply for some as the set A is …nite. We say that mapping is one-step if = 1 (this is equivalent to = 2 ), and we call an MPE simple if is one-step.
Given an MPE , we call allocation x stable if (x) = x. Naturally, 1 maps any allocation into a stable allocation.
Our …rst result deals with existence of an equilibrium and its basic properties.
7 See Examples A4 and A5 in the Online Appendix, where allowing for non-Markov strategies or dropping the requirement that transitions be the same for every protocol can lead to counterintuitive equilibria.
1. There exists a protocol-free Markov Perfect Equilibrium .
2. Every protocol-free MPE is acyclic.
3. Every protocol-free MPE is simple.
4. Every protocol-free MPE is e¢ cient, in that it involves no waste (for any x 2 A, k (x)k = kxk).
These results are quite strong, and are made possible by the requirement that the equilibrium be protocol-free. For a …xed protocol, equilibria might involve multiple iterations before reaching a stable allocations (see Example A3 in the Online Appendix). However, these other equilibria critically depend on the protocol and are therefore fragile; in contrast, transition mappings supported by protocol-free MPE are robust (e.g., they would remain if the protocols are taken from a di¤erent distribution, for example).
The proof of Proposition 1 is technically cumbersome and is relegated to the Online Appendix.
However, the idea is quite straightforward. We construct a candidate transition mapping that we want to be implemented in the equilibrium. If the society starts the period in state x = x t 1 such that (x) = x, we verify that it is a best response for the veto players to block any transitions except for those that are blocked by a coalition of non-veto players, and thus x remains intact. If the society starts the period in state x such that (x) 6 = x, we verify that there is a feasible vector of small transfers that may be redistributed from those who strictly bene…t from such transition to those who are indi¤erent, and that the society would be able to agree on such vector over the course of the protocol. The second result, the acyclicity of MPE, relies on the presence of transaction costs, which rules out the possibility of non-veto players shu-ing units among themselves (Example A1 in exhibits cyclic equilibria that would exist in the absence of this assumption). To show that every protocol-free MPE is simple, we show that if there were an allocation from where the society would expect to reach a stable allocation in exactly two steps, then for a suitable protocol it would instead decide to skip the intermediate step and transit to the stable allocation immediately. Finally, given that every MPE is simple, the society may always allocate the objects that would otherwise be wasted to some veto player (e.g., the proposer) without facing adverse dynamic consequences ("the slippery slope"), which ensures that each transitions involves no waste and the allocations are e¢ cient.
The following corollary highlights that the possibility of small transfers may be viewed as an equilibrium re…nement. 
Stable Allocations
Our next goal is to get a more precise characterization of equilibrium mappings and stable allocations. Let us de…ne a dominance relation B on A as follows:
y B x () kyk kxk and fi 2 N : y i x i g 2 W and y j > x j for some j 2 V .
Intuitively, allocation y dominates allocation x if transition from x to y is feasible and some powerful player prefers y to x strictly so as to be willing to make this motion, and also there is a winning coalition that (weakly) prefers x to y. Note that this does not imply that y will be proposed or supported in an actual voting against x because of further changes this move may lead to. Following the classic de…nition (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), we call a set of states S A von
Neumann-Morgenstern-(vNM-)stable if the following two conditions hold: (i) For no two states x; y 2 S it holds that y B x (internal stability); and (ii) For each x 6 2 S there exists y 2 S such that y B x (external stability).
The role of this dominance relation for our redistributive game is demonstrated by the following result.
Proposition 2 For any protocol-free MPE , the set of stable allocations S = fx 2 A : (x) = xg is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set for the dominance relation B.
Proposition 2 implies that the …xed points of transition mappings of non-cooperative equilibria described in Proposition 1 correspond to a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Our next result states that such stable set is also unique; this implies, in particular, that for any two protocol-free MPE and 0 , the set of stable allocations is identical. Consequently, we are able to study stable allocations irrespective of a particular equilibrium of the bargaining game.
The next Proposition 3 gives a precise characterization of stable allocations. To formulate it, let us denote m = n v, the number of non-veto players; q = k v, the number of non-veto players that is required in any winning coalition; d = m q + 1 = n k + 1, the size of a minimal blocking coalition of non-veto players; and, …nally, r = bm=dc, the maximum number of pairwise disjoint blocking coalition that non-veto players may be split into.
Proposition 3 For the binary relation B, a vNM-stable set exists and is unique. 8 Each element x of this set S has the following structure: the set of non-veto players M = N n V may be split into a disjoint union of r groups G 1 ; : : : ; G r of size d and one (perhaps empty) group G 0 of size m rd, such that inside each group, the distribution of wealth is equal: The proof of this result is important for understanding the structure of endogenous veto groups, and we provide it in the text. We show that starting from any wealth allocation x 2 S, it is impossible to redistribute the units between non-veto players without making at least d players worse o¤, and thus no redistribution would gain support from a winning coalition. In contrast, starting from any allocation x = 2 S, such redistribution is possible. Furthermore, our proof will show that there is an equilibrium where in any transition, the set of individuals who are worse o¤ is limited to the d 1 richest non-veto players.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will prove that set S, as de…ned in Part 2, is vNM-stable, thus ensuring existence. To show internal stability, suppose that x; y 2 S and y B x, and let the r groups be G 1 ; : : : ; G r and H 1 ; : : : ; H r , respectively. Without loss of generality, we can assume that each set of groups is ordered so that x G j and y H j are non-increasing in j for 1 j r. Let us prove, by induction, that x G j y H j for all j.
The induction base is as follows. Suppose that the statement is false and x G 1 > y H 1 ; then
x G 1 > y s for all s 2 M . This yields that for all agents i 2 G 1 ; we have x i > y i . Since the total number of agents in G 1 is d, G 1 is a blocking coalition, and therefore it cannot be true that y j x j for a winning coalition, contradicting that y B x.
8 Proposition A1 in the Online Appendix proves this set is also the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994).
For the induction step, suppose that x G l y H l for 1 l < j, and also assume, to obtain a contradiction, that x G j > y H j . Given the ordering of groups, this means that for any l; s such that 1 l j and j s r, x G l > y Hs . Consequently, for agent i 2 S j l=1 G l to have y i x i , he must belong to S j 1 s=1 H s . This implies that for at least jd (j 1) d = d agents in S j l=1 G l M , it cannot be the case that y i x i , which contradicts the assumption that y B x. This establishes that x G j y H j for all j, and therefore P i2M x i P i2M y i . But y B x would require that x i y i for all i 2 V with at least one inequality strict, which implies P i2N x i < P i2N y i , a contradiction to kyk kxk. This proves internal stability of set S.
Let us now show that the external stability condition holds. To do this, we take any x 6 2 S and will show that there is y 2 S such that y B x. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x i is non-increasing for 1 i m (i.e., non-veto players are ordered from richest to poorest). Let us denote G j = f(j 1) d + 1; : : : ; jdg for 1 j r and G 0 = M n S r j=1 G j . Since x 6 2 S, it must be that either for some G j , 1 j r, the agents in G j do not get the same allocation, or they do, but some individual i 2 G 0 has x i > 0. In the latter case, we de…ne y by
(In other words, we take everything possessed by individuals in G 0 and distribute it among veto players, for example, by giving everything to one of them). Obviously, y 2 S and y B x.
If there exists a group G j such that not all of its members have the same amount of wealth, let j be the smallest such number. For i 2 G l with l < j, we let y i = x i . Take the …rst d 1 members of group G j , Z = f(j 1) d + 1; : : : ; jd 1g. Together, they possess z = P jd 1 i=(j 1)d+1 x i > (d 1) x jd (the inequality is strict precisely because not all x i in G j are equal). Let us now take these z units and redistribute it among all the agents (perhaps including those in Z) in the following way. For each s : j < s < r, we let y 
having z c > 0 remaining in our disposal. As before, we let y m+1 = x m+1 + z c and y i = x i for i > m + 1. We have constructed y 2 S such that kyk = kxk, y m+1 > x m+1 and fi 2 N : y i < x i g Z. The latter, given jZj d 1, implies fi 2 N : y i x i g 2 W, which means y B x. This completes the proof of external stability, and thus S is vNM-stable.
Let us now show that S is a unique stable set de…ned by B. 9 Suppose not, so there is S 0 that is also vNM-stable. Let us prove that x 2 S , x 2 S 0 by induction on P i2M x i . The induction base is trivial: if x i = 0 for all i 2 M , then x 2 S by de…nition of S. If x = 2 S 0 , then there must be some y such that y B x. But for such y,
which contradicts kyk kxk.
The induction step is as follows. Suppose that for some x with P i2M x i = j > 0, x 2 S but x = 2 S 0 (the vice-versa case is treated similarly). By external stability of S 0 , x = 2 S 0 implies that for some y 2 S 0 , y B x, which in turn yields that P i2V y i > P i2V x i and kyk kxk. We have
For y such that P i2M y i < j induction yields that y 2 S , y 2 S 0 , and thus y 2 S. Consequently, there exists some y 2 S such that y B x, but this contradicts x 2 S. This contradiction establishes uniqueness of the stable set.
Proposition 3 enables us to study the set of stable allocations S without reference to a particular equilibrium . The characterization obtained in this Proposition gives several important insights.
First, the set of stable allocations (…xed points of any transition mapping under any equilibrium) does not depend on the mapping; it maps into itself when either the veto players V or the non-veto players N n V are reshu-ed in any way. Second, the allocation of wealth among veto players does not have any e¤ect on stability of allocations. Third, each stable allocation has a well-de…ned "class"structure: every non-veto player with a positive allocation is part of a group of size d (or a multiple of d) of equally-endowed individuals who have incentives to protect each other's interests. 10 To demonstrate how such protection works, consider the following example.
Example 6 There are b = 12 units, n = 5 individuals with one veto player (#5), and the supermajority of 4 is needed for a transition (k = 4). By Proposition 3, stable allocations have two groups of size two. Let be a transition mapping for some simple MPE , and let us start with 9 An alternative (non-constructive) way to prove uniqueness is to use a theorem by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) that states that if a dominance relation allows for no …nite or in…nite cycles, the stable set is unique.
1 0 It is permissible that two groups have equal allocations, xG j = xG k , or that members of some or all groups get zero. In particular, any allocation x where xi = 0 for all i 2 M is in S. Notice that if non-veto players get the same under two allocations x and y, so xjM = yjM , then x 2 S , y 2 S; moreover, this is true if xi = y (i) for all i 2 M and some permutation on M . stable allocation x = (4; 4; 2; 2; 0) : Suppose that we exogenously remove a unit from player #2 and give it to the veto player; i.e., consider y = (4; 3; 2; 2; 1). Allocation y is unstable, and player #1 will necessarily be expropriated. However, the way redistribution may take place is not unique; for example, (y) = (3; 3; 2; 2; 2) is possible, but so is (y) = (2; 3; 3; 2; 2) or (y) = (2; 3; 2; 3; 2). Now suppose that one of the players possessing two units, say player #3, was expropriated, i.e., take z = (4; 4; 1; 2; 1). Then it is possible that the other member, player #4, would be expropriated as well: (z) = (4; 4; 1; 1; 2). But it is also possible that one of the richer players may be expropriated instead: e.g., a transition to (z) = (4; 1; 1; 4; 2) would be supported by all players except #2.
Example 6 demonstrates that equilibrium protection that agents provide to each other may extend beyond members of the same group. In the latter case, player #2 would oppose a move from (4; 4; 2; 2; 0) to (4; 4; 1; 2; 1) if in the subgame the next move is to (4; 1; 1; 4; 2). Thus, richer players might protect poorer ones, but not vice versa; as Proposition 4 below shows, this is a general phenomenon.
We see that in general, an exogenous shock may lead to expropriation, on the subsequent equilibrium path, of players belonging to di¤erent wealth groups; the particular path depends on the equilibrium mapping, which is not unique. However, if we apply the re…nement that only equilibria with a "minimal" (in terms of the number of units that need to be transferred) redistribution along the equilibrium path are allowed, then only the players with exactly the same wealth would su¤er from the redistribution that follows a shock. More importantly, Example 6 demonstrates the mechanism of mutual protection among players with the same wealth. If a non-veto player becomes poorer, at least d 1 other players would su¤er in the subsequent redistribution. This makes them willing to oppose any redistribution from any of their members. Their number, if we include the initial expropriation target himself, is d, which is su¢ cient to block a transition. Thus, members of the same group have an incentive to act as a politically cohesive coalition, in which its members mutually protect each others'economic interests.
Proposition 3 also allows for the following simple corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose that in game de…ned above, the set of stable allocations (in any protocol-free MPE) is S. Take any integer h > 1, and consider the set of allocations A h given by A h = x 2 R + n : kxk b and 8i 2 N; hx i 2 Z . The next proposition generalizes Example 6 so that one can better understand the mechanics of mutual protection. It highlights that protection of a non-veto player is sustained, in equilibrium, by equally endowed or richer individuals, rather than by those who has less wealth. Proposition 4 is formulated as follows. We take some equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3, and consider a stable allocation. Then, we consider another, perturbed, allocation, in which one non-veto player has less wealth. We show that the resulting allocation is unstable, and compare the ultimate stable allocation with the initial, uperturbed one.
Proposition 4 Consider any MPE and let = . Suppose that the voting rule is not unanimity (k < n), so d > 1. Take any stable allocation x 2 S, some non-veto player i 2 M , and let new allocation y 2 A be such that yj M nfig = xj M nfig and y i < x i . Then:
1. Player i will never be as well o¤ as before the shock, but he will not get any worse o¤ :
Furthermore, the number of players who su¤ er as a result of a redistribution on the equilibrium path de…ned by is given by:
2. Suppose, in addition, that for any k 2 M with x k < x i , x k y i , i.e., the shock did not make player i poorer than the players in the next wealth group. Then [ (y)] j < y j implies x j x i ;
i.e., members of poorer wealth groups do not su¤ er from redistribution.
The essence of Proposition 4 is that following a negative (exogenous) shock to some player's wealth (y i < x i ), at least d 1 other players are expropriated, and player i never fully recovers. If the shock is relatively minor so the ranking of player i with respect to other wealth groups did not 1 1 Notice that since the sequence of stable sets satis…es S S 2 S 3 , their limit is a well-de…ned set S 1 = S j>1 S j , where the bar denotes topological closure. This set has the following simple structure:
where is the (N 1)-dimensional unit simplex and 2 S n is any permutation. However, for these limit allocations to be approached in a noncooperative game that we study, one would have to take a sequence of discount factors j that tends to 1, so interactions should be more and more frequent. Intuitively, to study …ne partitions of the state space, one would need …ner partition of time intervals as well to prevent 'undercutting'. If this condition does not hold, veto players would be able to expropriate everything in the long run (see, e.g., Nunnari, 2016) . change (weak inequalities are preserved), 12 then it must be equally endowed or richer people who su¤er from subsequent redistribution. Thus, in the initial stable allocation x, they have incentives to protect i from the negative shock. This result may be extended to the case when a negative shock a¤ects more than one (but less than d) non-veto players. The proof is straightforward when all the a¤ected players belong to the same wealth group. However, this requirement is not necessary. If expropriated players belong to di¤erent groups, then the lower bound of the resulting wealth after redistribution is the amount of wealth that the poorest (post-shock) player possesses. In this case, the number of players who su¤er as a result of the redistribution following the shock is still limited by d 1.
Our next step is to derive comparative statics with respect to di¤erent voting rules given by k and v.
Comparing Voting Rules
Suppose that we vary the supermajority requirement, k, and the number of veto players, v. The following result easily follows from the characterization in Proposition 3.
Proposition 5 Fix the number of individuals n.
1. The size of each group G j , j 1, is decreasing as the supermajority requirement k increases.
In particular, for k = v + 1, d = n v = m, and thus all the non-veto players form a single group; for k = n (unanimity rule), d = 1, and so each player can veto any change.
2. The number of groups is weakly increasing in k, from 1 when k = v + 1 to m when k = n (from 0 when k < v + 1).
3. The size of each group G j , j 1 does not depend on the number of veto players, but as v increases, the number of groups weakly decreases, reaching zero for v > n d.
This result implies that the size of groups does not depend on the number of veto players, but only on the supermajority requirement as it determines the minimal size of blocking coalitions. As the supermajority requirement increases, groups become smaller. This has a very simple intuition:
as redistribution becomes harder (it is necessary to get approval of more players), it takes fewer non-veto players to defend themselves; as such, smaller groups are su¢ cient. Conversely, the largest group (all non-veto players together) is formed when a single vote from a non-veto player is su¢ cient for veto players to accept a redistribution; in this case, non-veto players can only keep a positive payo¤ by holding equal amounts. Now, consider the number of groups that (the non-veto part of) the society is divided into.
Intuitively, the number of groups corresponds to the maximum possible economic heterogeneity that a society can have in equilibrium. If we interpret the equally-endowed non-veto members of the society as economic classes (in the sense that members of the same class have similar possessions, whereas members of di¤erent classes have di¤erent amount of wealth, despite having the same political power), then the number of groups would correspond to the largest number of economic classes that the society can contain. With this interpretation, Proposition 4 implies that it is members of the same or richer economic classes that protect a non-veto player from expropriation.
Still, there might be some residual indeterminacy about the number of classes: for any parameters it is possible that all non-veto players possess zero and thus belong to the same class; similarly, Part 2 of Proposition 3 allows for classes that are larger than others and that span several groups G j .
Thus, societies with few groups are bound to be homogenous (among non-veto players), whereas societies with many veto groups might be heterogenous with respect to wealth.
To better understand the determinants of the number of groups, take n large and v small (so that m is large enough) and start with the smallest possible value of k = v + 1. Then all the non-veto players possess the same wealth in any equilibrium. In other words, all players, except perhaps those endowed with veto power, must be equal. If we increase k, then two groups will form, one of which may possess a positive amount, while the rest possesses zero, which is clearly more heterogenous than for k = v + 1. If we increase k further beyond v + (m + 1) =2, then both groups may possess positive amounts and a third group will form further, etc. In other words, as k increases, so does the number of groups, which implies that the society becomes less and less homogenous and can support more and more groups of smaller size. We see that in this model, heterogeneity of the society is directly linked to di¢ culty of expropriation, measured by the degree of majority needed for expropriation or, equivalently, by the minimal size of a coalition that is able to resist attempts to expropriate. If we interpret the equally-endowed groups as economic classes, then we have the following result: the more politically di¢ cult it is to expropriate, the …ner is the class division of the society.
Corollary 3 Suppose that k = v + 1; as before, d = n v. In this case, an allocation x is stable if Proposition 5 dealt with comparing stable allocations for di¤erent k and v. We now study whether or not an allocation that was stable under some rules k and v remains stable if these rules change. For example, suppose that we make an extra individual a veto player (increase v), or increase the majority rule requirement (increase k). A naive intuition would say that in both these cases, individuals would not be worse o¤ from better property rights protection. As the next proposition shows, in general, the opposite is likely to be true. Let S k;V denote the set of stable allocations under the supermajority requirement k and the set of veto players V:
Proposition 6 Suppose that allocation x is stable for k (k < n) and v (x 2 S k;V ). Then: 2. Suppose k + 1 < n and all groups G j , j 0, had di¤ erent amounts of wealth under x:
x G j 6 = x G j 0 for j 0 6 = j (and xj M 6 = 0). If we increase the majority requirement from k to
The …rst part of this proposition suggests that adding a veto player makes an allocation unstable, and therefore will lead to a redistribution hurting some individual. There is only one exception to this rule: if the new veto player had nothing to begin with, then the allocation will remain stable.
On the other hand, if the new veto player had a positive amount of wealth, then, while he will be weakly better o¤ from becoming a veto player, there will be at least one other non-veto player who will be worse o¤. Indeed, removing a member of one of the groups G j without changing the required sizes of the groups must lead to redistribution. This logic would not apply if V 0 = N , when all players become veto players; however, the proposition is still true in this case because then i would have to be the last non-veto player, and under k < n he would have to get x i = 0 in a stable allocation x. Interestingly, removing a veto player i (making him non-veto) will also make x unstable as long as x i > 0. This is, of course, less surprising, as this individual may be expected to be worse o¤.
The second part says that if all groups got di¤erent allocations (which is the typical case), then an increase in k would decrease the required group sizes, leading to redistribution. When some groups have equal amounts of wealth in a stable allocation, then allocation x may, in principle, remain stable. This is trivially true when all non-veto players get zero (x i = 0 for all i = 2 V ), but, as the following Example 7 demonstrates, this is possible in other cases as well.
Example 7 Suppose n = 7, V = f#7g, b = 6 and the supermajority requirement is k = 5. Then x = (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0) is a stable allocation, because d = 3 and the non-veto players form two groups of size three. If we increase k to k 0 = 6, then x remains stable, as then d 0 = 2 and x has three groups of size two.
Discussion
In this section, we put two main contributions of our paper, the emergence of a class structure in a multilateral bargaining setting and the non-monotonic e¤ect of the number of veto players and supermajority requirements on the stability of allocations, in the context of the existing literature.
Also, we discuss the role of speci…c technical assumptions.
In Propositions 2 and 3, we established one-to-one correspondence between stable allocations of the non-cooperative bargaining game and a unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, which greatly simpli…ed the analysis. Similar links between cooperative and noncooperative de…nitions of stability were observed in earlier works: the theoretical foundations for implementation of the vNM-stable set in noncooperative games are laid down in Anesi (2006 Anesi ( , 2010 and Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2012) , in games of di¤erent generality. In contrast with these studies, we allow players to be indi¤erent among allocations, which required us to de…ne vNM-stability with respect to a di¤erent dominance relation. The main novel aspect of the current paper is the explicit and intuitive characterization of the stable set (Proposition 3). This characterization allowed us to more thoroughly explore the forces that make a stable allocation stable, and to study reactions of these stable allocations to exogenous shocks, thus identifying players that would resist deviations from a stable allocation (Proposition 4).
The tractability of the model, made possible by this explicit characterization, allowed to study comparative statics with respect to the two main parameters: the number of veto players and the supermajority requirement. In static models, more veto players and/or a higher degree of supermajority make any given allocation more likely to be stable, because a larger coalition is required to change it (see, e.g., Tsebelis, 2002 , in case of veto players and Chapter 6 in AustenSmith and Banks, 2005 , in case of supermajority requirements). This paper proves that in dynamic models the impact of these parameters on stability of allocations is nonmonotone, and it is the …rst do so, to the best of knowledge. We also show, in Proposition 6, that an increase in the number of veto players or the supermajority requirement generically destroys stability of an allocation.
While the idea of non-monotonicity in a multilateral bargaining setting is intuitive, such results have not been stated formally, most likely due to the di¢ culty of obtaining a tractable characterization in such models. However, similar e¤ects in literature on voting on reforms (even in two-period models) have been known. In Barbera and Jackson (2004) , if some voting rule is stable, then one that requires a larger degree of supermajority is not necessarily stable, because while more votes are needed to change the rule, many more players might …nd the new rule suboptimal and be willing to change it. Similarly, Gehlbach and Malesky (2010) show that an additional veto player might allow for a reform that would have been impossible otherwise as some players fear slippery slope. 13 The explicit characterization demonstrates that stable allocations are organized as "economic classes", members of which protect each other from expropriation. This is in contrast with the existing literature on bargaining with an endogenous status quo, starting with Kalandrakis, 2004, which emphasizes eventual appropriation of the entire surplus by a single player. We would argue that economic classes comprised of similar individuals is a more realistic outcome. The observation that di¤erent ex ante identical players might be split into groups with similar payo¤s has remote antecedents in the legislative bargaining literature: e.g., in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , the set of players is ultimately sub-divided into three distinct groups, ordered in terms of wealth: the proposer, the winning coalition, and the rest. 14 In Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2006) , the last proposer is able to implement his ideal policy, thus again dividing the society into three unequal groups. In these papers, this split into groups resulted from terminal-period e¤ects. Our results demonstrate that economic classes may emerge in a dynamic environment with no terminal period;
we also study the e¤ects of the models' primitives on their numbers and their sizes, showing, in particular, that a larger supermajority requirement results in a larger number of smaller classes (Propositions 3 and 5).
Any model of legislative bargaining makes a number of speci…c modeling assumptions. 15 Perhaps most consequentially, ours is a model of discrete policy space. Overall, the literature on multilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo is split between papers that assume a continuous (dividea-dollar) policy space and a discrete (e.g., …nite) one. Baron and Ferejohn (1989a) , Kalandrakis (2004 Kalandrakis ( , 2007 Kalandrakis ( , 2010 , Baron and Bowen (2013) , Richter (2013) , Seidmann (2014), Nunnari (2016) , among others, assume that the policy space is continuous, while Anesi (2010 ), Diermeier and Fong (2011 , and Anesi and Duggan (2016) assume a discrete one, as we do. We view the bene…t of our approach mainly in that it considerably simpli…es the analysis: in fact, the use of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in all voting models that we are aware of requires a discrete space. While we are not able to analyze the model with a continuous policy space, it is reassuring that the limit set of our equilibrium allocations when the size of the unit approaches zero has the same class structure as the set of stable sets in Proposition 3, suggesting further robustness of our results.
When indi¤erences are present because of the nature of the model, most papers, including Kalandrakis (2004) , Diermeier and Fong (2011) , and Anesi and Duggan (2015) , assume that a player supports the new proposal when indi¤erent. In contrast, Baron and Bowen (2013) argue that it is important to assume that players vote against the proposal when indi¤erent. Anesi and requirement may have nonmonotone e¤ects as it in ‡uences pivotal events that players condition upon. 1 4 While the identity of the …rst proposer and thus the realized allocation is random, the expected payo¤s are identical in all SPE, as shown by Eraslan (2002) and, in a more general setting, by Eraslan and McLennan (2013) .
1 5 There is an important parallel in the coalition formation literature. See, e.g., Seidmann and Winter (1998) on the impact of the possibility of renegotiation on the structure of the ultimate coalition, and Hyndman and Ray (2007) on equilibria in games with possible binding constraints. Seidmann (2015) assume that players are supportive of the proposal, when indi¤erent, depending on the coalition formed on the equilibrium path. (Anesi and Duggan, 2015 , extend this construction to the spatial setting.) We assume that transitions unlock an arbitrarily small budget that may be used to resolve indi¤erences. Intuitively, this breaks indi¤erences in the direction of accepting the proposal, which is consistent with the contract theory literature (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004) .
The fact that the results hold for any size of this additional budget provided that it is small enough points to robustness of our equilibria.
Conclusion
The modern literature often considers constitutional constraints and other formal institutions as instruments of property rights protection. The relationship between veto power given to di¤erent government bodies, supermajority requirements, or additional checks and balances and better protection seems so obvious that there is little left to explain. Allston and Mueller (2008) proclaim:
"A set of universally shared beliefs in a system of checks and balances is what separates populist democracies from democracies with respect for the rule of law." Yet, from a political economy perspective, property rights systems should be understood as equilibrium outcomes rather than exogenous …xed constraints. Legislators or, more generally, any political actors cannot commit to entitlements, prerogatives, and rights. Rather, any allocation must be maintained in equilibrium.
Our results suggest that a dynamic perspective may lead to a more subtle understanding of the e¤ects of veto players and supermajority rules. In a dynamic environment, they lead to emergence of endogenous veto groups of players that sustain a stable allocation in equilibrium. The society has a "class structure": any non-veto player with a positive wealth is part of a group of equallyendowed individuals who have incentives to protect each other's interests. The e¤ect of exogenous constraints on endogenous veto groups is complex. One the one hand, endogenous veto groups may protect each other in equilibrium even in the absence of formal veto rights. One the other hand, adding more veto players may lead to more instability and policy change if such additions upset dynamic equilibria where players were mutually protecting each other.
Models of multilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo seem to be a natural and very fruitful approach to study the political economy of property rights protection. Our results point to the importance of looking beyond formally de…ned property rights, and more, generally, beyond formal institutions. Thus, a change in formal institutions might strengthen protection of property rights of designated players, yet have negative consequences for protection of property rights of the others, and, as a result, a negative overall e¤ect.
